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in the case of Zorach v. Clauson1 affirms the constitutionality of the
New York City program for releasing pupils from public schools so
that they may attend religious education classes held outside of school
property. The pupils are released upon the written request of their
parents, and those not released from school remain in their classrooms.2
Regulations under which the program is conducted prohibit comment
by school officials on attendance.3 Plaintiffs, who were taxpayers and
parents of children attending the public schools, unsuccessfully contended that the program was a violation of the First Amendment as
i Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). The lower courts upheld
the program, Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631, 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 339 (1950), affd. 278
App. Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 27 (1951), affd. 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463
(1951), noted, 61 YALB L.J. 405 (1951); 27 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 120 (1951); 37 VA.
L. Rnv. 1146 (1951). The program had been previously found valid in Lewis v. Graves,
245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927), but was :relitigated in the light of McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 '(1948).
2 "Absence for religious observance and education shall be permitted under rules that
the commissioner shall establish." 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1947) §3210, l(b).
The rules so established are:
"l. Absence of a pupil from school during school hours for religious observance and
education to be had outside the school buildings and grounds will be excused upon the
request in writing signed by the parent or guardian of the pupil.
"2. The courses in religious observance and education must be maintained and operated by or under the control of a duly constituted religious body or of duly constituted
religious bodies.
"3. Pupils must be registered for the courses and a copy of the registration filed with
the local public school authorities.
"4. Reports of attendance of pupils upon such courses shall be filed with the principal
or teacher at the end of each week.
"5. Such absence shall be for not more than one hour ·each week at the close of a
session at a time to be fixed by the local school authorities.
"6. In the event that more than one school for religious observance and education is
maintained in any district, the hour for absence for each particular public school in such
district shall be the same for all such religious schools." Regulations of the Commissioner
of Education, Art. 17, §154 (1 N.Y. Official Code Comp. 683), quoted in Zorach v.
Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 at 464 (1951).
a "l. A program for religious instruction may be initiated by any religious organization, in cooperation with the parents of pupils concerned. There will be no announcement of any kind in the public schools relative to the program.
"2. When a religious organization is prepared to initiate a program for religious
instruction, the said organization will notify parents to enroll their children with the religious organization, and will issue to each enrolled pupil a card countersigned by the
parent and addressed to the principal of the public school, requesting the release of the
pupil from school for the purpose of religious instruction at a specific location. The said
cards will be filed in the office of the public school as a record of pupils entitled to be
excused, and will not be available for any other purpose.
"3. Religious organizations, in cooperation with parents, will assume full responsibility for attendance at the religious center and will file with the school principal, weekly,
a card attendance record and in cases of absence from religious instruction, a statement of
the reason therefor.
"4. Upon the presentation of a proper request as above prescribed, pupils of any
grade will be dismissed from school for the last hour of the day's session on one day of each
week to be designated by the Superintendent of Schools; A different day may be designated
for each borough.
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included within the Fourteenth Amendment4 o~ the ground that it
was a prohibited "establishment of religion" as defined in the McCollum
case.11 The Supreme Court through Justice Douglas, in upholding
the New York program, distinguished the McCollum case upon the
ground that the Illinois released time program therein found invalid
took place within the school buildings, whereas the New York program was carried on outside of school property.6 Justices Frankfurter,
Black, ~nd Jackson, dissenting, thought the New York program unconstitutional in view of the McCollum case.
In the McCollum case, the Supreme Court defined "establishment
of religion" in terms so sweeping that virtually any religious education
program could be included within the definition.7 In the voluminous
comment which followed that case, two extreme positions were evident. 8 Extreme opponents of released time seized upon the expression
"wall of separation between Church and State"9 as being a formula
prohibiting any and every type of religious education which might
"5. Pupils released for religious instruction will be dismissed from school in the usual
way and the school authorities have no responsibility beyond that assumed in regular dismissals.
"6. There shall be no comment by any principal or teacher on the attendance or nonattendance of any pupil upon religious instruction." Regulations of the Board of Education
of the City of New York, reported in Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d)
463 at 464-465 (1951).
4 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST., Amend. I. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
Ii McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
6Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 309, 315, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
7 "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter·
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between church and State."' Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
l at 15-16, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947), quoted in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 at 210-211, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
8 "Religious Education and the Public Schools: A Symposium," 43 REumous EnuCATION 193 (1948); Symposium, ''Religion and the State," 14 LAW AND CoNTEM. Pnon.
1 (1949). The controversy has continued to date; see Taylor, "Equal Protection of Religion: Today's Public School Problem," and Moehlman, "The Wall of Separation: The
Law and the Facts," 3S A.B.A.J. 277, 281 (April, 1952).
9 Supra note 7.
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utilize public school funds or time.10 Extreme proponents of released
time, on the other hand, equated "secularist" with "socialist"11 and
"atheist,"12 even to the extent of suggesting that the Supreme Court
itself violated the Constitution by establishing a "religion without a
church."13 The Supreme Court, however, seems to have decided the
Zorach case by a process of balancing the interests involved in public
and sectarian education.14 The scope of this comment is limited to
showing the nature and propriety of this relative measure of an "establishment of religion."

I
It is believed that the controversy over released time can be most
easily seen as the resultant of three major historical forces: (l) the
political concept of freedom of religion from state control, and of the
·state from religious control;15 (2) the growth of public education, not
only in quantitative terms, but in importance as a factor in perpetuating
democracy;16 (3) the increasing complexity of industrial society which
forces parents to rely upon schools to furnish knowledge previously
either unnecessary or imparted in the home.17 Error is inherent in
oversimplification; and likewise, there is no simple method of correctly tracing the evolution of even these oversimplified factors in a
brief manner. It is hoped, however, that the following attempt to
dp so will clarify the problem of released time as one of degree and not
one of absolutes.
.
The first compulsory education law was enacted in Massachusetts
in 1647,18 and had the avowed purpose of furthering the religious tenents
of the theocracy then in existence.19 Although -there is doubtless some
10 Brrrrs, THE AMERICAN TRADrnoN IN RELIGION µm EnucATION (1950); THAYER,
THE ATrACX. UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL (1951); MOEHLMAN, THE WALL
OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CauRCH AND STATE (1951).
11 Quigley, ''The Relationship between Government and Church Sponsored Education," 43 Rm:.l:Gious EnuCATION 217 at 218 (1948).
12 O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 44, 45 (1949).
18 Murray, ''Law or Prepossessions?" 14 LAw .AND CoNTEM. PROB. 23 at 30 (1949).
14 Meiklejohn, ''Educational Cooperation Between Church and State," 14 LAw AND
CoNTEM. PROB. 61 (1949); Kauper, "The First Ten Amendments," 37 A.B.A.J. 717 at
784 (1951).
.
15ToRPBY, JUDICIAL DOCTIUNEs OF RELIGIOUS Rmars IN AMERicA 1-28 (1948).
161 MORISON AND CoMMACER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 511
(1942).
.
.
17BoWBR, CHURCH AND STATE IN EnucATION 28 (1944); cf. ELioT, NoTEs TowARDs
THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 107 (1949).
18 MoEHLMAN, THE CHURCH AS EDUCATOR 87 (1947).
,
19 The enactment began, "It being one chief project' of that old deluder, Satan, to keep
men from the knowledge of the Scriptures••••" Supra note 18.
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parallel between the Puritan emphasis upon education, and democratic ideals of equality,20 neither religious tolerance nor any concept
of "separation of church and state" was present in this first school
system. 21 The colonists felt that education was a function of the
church,22 and free schools were for paupers.23 It was not until the
early part of the nineteenth century that free schools under civil
control were accepted in the north, and the southern states seem to
have been without a comparable school system until after the Civil
War.24
The concept of political separation of church and state is manifest
not only in the First Amendment, but is epitomized in the disestablishment of the various state religions. The most famous disestablishment
was that of the Anglican Church in Virginia in 1786 which was made
possible by the variety of organized religions26 as well as by the noted
leadership of Madison and Jefferson with their ideas of political
morality and secular bases for conscience.26 Massachusetts, in 1833,
was the last state to disestablish its church.27 That this universal
abandonment of established churches is relevant to the present question
of released time seems self evident, but that it should be determinative
of the question is most doubtful. 28
Conflict between the concept of political separation of church and
state and the growing public school systems came with the Catholic
immigration.29 Religious education seems to have been separated from
secular education by about 1875 as recognition was given to Catholic
objections to use of the King James Bible in public schools. 30 By this
date, the schools had become, through school districts, political units
of the state, and were no longer an integral part of relatively homogeneous Protestant communities.31 When this separation of sectarian
20 PERRY, PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 192 (1944).
21 MoEHLMAN, ScHOOL AND CmmCH 7 (1944).
22 Meiklejohn, "From Church to State," REI.iomN AND

EnuCAnoN 5 (1945). (This
book is Volume 4 of a series on Religion in the post-war world edited by Dean Sperry).
28 1 MORISON AND CoMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUllUC 512
(1942).
24 Ibid.
25 O'Nmu, REI.ioroN AND EnuCATION UNDER 'l'HE CoNsnnrnoN 34 (1949).
2 6 SCHNEIDER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 56-59 (1946).
27 1 MORISON AND CoMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPuBuc 242
(1942).
2 8 After the disestablishment in Massachusetts, for example, Horace Mann believed
that some form of non-sectarian instruction should continue in the public schools. THAYER,
THE An:ACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL 11 (1951).
2 9 2 STOKES, Cmmca AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 549 (1950).
30 BoWER, CHURCH AND STATE IN EouCAnoN 28 (1944).
31 Id. at 26.
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and secular education took place, the family and church were more
capable of imparting religious instruction than they are at present.
Industrial society has not only tended to disintegrate family unity and
discipline but it has also necessarily increased the demands which the
school makes upon the pupils' time.32 Thus, that which the parents
and churches find themselves less capable of doing individually today,
they are attempting to do by acting in their political capadty to call
upon the assistance of the public school system. The constitutional
limits upon such attempts must be found in the cases.

II
In the McCollum case, three elements seemed to support the finding of unconstitutionality of the Illinois released time plan. (I) The
religious instruction was carried on within the public school building, thus utilizing tax funds. (2) There was close cooperation between
the religious groups and the school authorities. (3) Absence from the
legally required duty of school attendance was conditioned upon
attendance at sectarian instruction.33 The New York program litigated
in the Zorach case differs in respect to the first two of these elements but
seems identical regarding the third.34 (1) There was no use of tax
funds in the New York program.35 (2) There was only enough cooperation between the school officials and the religious groups to insure efficient-operation of the New York program.36 (3) There was,
however, in the New York program, the same conditionally authorized
absence and consequent segregation of participants in the program
frqm non-participants.37 Even in this latter point of identity between
the two programs, the New York program might be distinguished
because the segregation was not by particular sects within the school
building.38 It should be noted that in upholding the constitutionality
32 Supra note 17; cf. International Council of Religious Education, "Statement of
Policy" (1949).
83 McCollum v, Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 at 209, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948); Remmlein, "The Legal Situation Resulting from the Recent Supreme Court Decision," 43 RELIGIOUS EnuCAnoN 211 at 212 (1948); Note, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 716 at 718 (1951).
34 The numerous factual distinctions listed in the opinion of the trial court seem subordinate to these two differences. Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631 at 638, 99 N.Y.S. (2d)
339 (1950); same, Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66 at 72, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 682 (1948),
appeal withdrawn, 299 N.Y. 564, 85 N.E. (2d) 791 (1949).
35 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 308-309, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
ss Id. at 313.
37 Id. at 321. Opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting.
38 Segregation within the school building seems to have been one of the main objections to the lliinois released time plan. Pfeffer, "Religion, Education, and the Constitu•
tion," 8 LAWYERS' GUILD REv. 387 at 397 (1948).
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of the New York program, the Court expressly reserved any question
of coercion of the pupils to attend the religious instruction.39
Justification for the majority's finding of a constitutional difference
between the two programs must be found by an examination of the
competing interests. One possible analysis is that the released time
legislation is an exercise of religious liberty by a majority of the people
of New York. The decision of the Zorach case is then justified by
saying that the amount of aid to religion is not sufficient to warrant
restraint upon the free exercise of religion of those who support the
legislation.40 A better analysis seems to be to characterize the released
time legislation as an exercise .of political power, and balance that
power against the rights of those who oppose the legislation as an
infringement on the free exercise of religion.41 This latter analysis
seems to give meaning to the statement of the majority in the Zorach
case that the First Amendment "studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency ..." of Church and State.42
Education is beyond doubt a major public interest.43 And in the
context of religious education, this interest has been recognized by
allowing the state to furnish textbooks44 and transportation4 r; to pupils
attending parochial schools, and to permit the reading of the Bible in
public schools.46 However, the rights of the individuals who oppose
state power prevent the abolition of private schools47 or the unreasonable regulation of the curriculum of all schools.48 And, as was decided
39 The question of actual coercion was not properly raised in the state courts. Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 311-312, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). Frankfurter, J., dissenting,
believed that the facts as to actual coercion were necessary to decide the issue. Id. at 322.
It has been suggested that the New York program is constitutional in theory but not in
fact. Note, 49 CoL. L. REv. 836 (1949).
40 Opinion of Desmond, J., concurring, Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.
(2d) 463 at 469 (1951); Murray, ''Law or Prepossessions?" 14 I.Aw AND CoNTBM, Pnon.
23 at 36 (1949): note, 61 YALE L.J. 405 at 410 (1951). This analysis seems to leave.
unanswered the problem as to the criteria for measuring allowable state aid to religion.
41 Supra note 14.
42 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 312, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
48 Meiklejohn, "Educational Cooperation between Church and State," 14 I.Aw AND
CoNTBM. Pnon. 61 at 71 (1949).
44 Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335 (1930).
45 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
46 Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952). The taxpayers
who were complaining were found to have insufficient interest to present a "case or controversy." It was indicated that had they been parents of children currently attending the
school, then they might have had standing to challenge the alleged "establishment of
religion."
47 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
48 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923).
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_in the McCollum case, the right of the individual prevents operation
of one type of released time program which infringes upon religious
freedom. 49 The line between allowable state power and the individual's
right is not one which can be defined with certainty, and the opinion
of the McCollum case seems to have drawn the line more in accord
with the opinion of the dissenting Justices of the Zorach case than ,,,vith
that of the majority. The Zorach case is a retreat from the position
taken in the McCollum case, for it abandons the absolute "wall of
separation between Church and State" formula. 50 In a broader sense,
however, that formula was abandoned at its inception in the Everson
case, in which the Court allowed incidental aid to a parochial school
because of the paramount public interest in safely transporting children to school. 51 The principle of the Zorach case seems to be that,
absent expenditure of tax funds, cooperation of a public school system
with religious education groups will be permitted so long as the religious liberty of pupils and parents is respected. However much one
may feel that the dissenting opinions of the Zorach case are correct
as to the merits of the particular question decided, the majority seems
to have adopted a more rational principle of interpreting the First
Amendment guarantees in a situation so complex that it is not susceptible of absolute measures.

III
Although the Zorach case properly enunciates a rational basis for
interpretation of the First Amendment, the prime danger of released
time programs should be remembered. A released time program uses
the public schools as a focal point for religious differences.52 Abuse of
such a program is easy, and many abuses may be beyond the reach of
legal remedy. 53 The Supreme Court is no longer a "National School
49 McCollum
50 "The First

v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the
prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State." Douglas, J., for the Court,
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 312, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
51 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947); Prior to the
Zorach case, however, the distinction between aid to the pupil and aid to religion seems to
have been accepted. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 754 (1950).
52 TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 329 (1948).
53 Kuebler, "To Reduce Tensions between Government and Church-Sponsored Education," 43 RELIGIOUS EouCATION 223 at 225 (1948). For example, a teacher may give
burdensome work to those children who remain behind. Note, 61 YALE L.J. 405 at 413
(1951).
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Board";54 its recognition of the interest of the community and state in
allowing public schools to cooperate with religious groups places the
burden directly upon those who sponsor such cooperation to protect
the rights of minority groups. 6 ;;

Frank Bowen, Jr., S.Ed.

Corwin, "The Supreme Court as National School Board," 14 LAw AND CoNTEM.
3 (1949).
55 Smaller communities would probably attain more satisfactory religious education
without the danger of released time by coordinated planning by church groups. Edmonson,
"Religious Education in Smith City," 43 REuGrous EnuCATION 229 (1948).
54

PROB.

